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Jeudi 3 Décembre 2009

Robert GARY-BOBO (CREST et Université Paris 1)
"Strikes and Slowdown in a Theory of Relational Contracts"
avec Touria JAAIDANE (Université de Lille 1)

de 14 h à 15 h 30 en Salle S016 à l'INSEE-CREST, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri, 92245 MALAKOFF (Métro : Malakoff/Plateau de Vanves (Immeuble "Malakoff 2)).


Résumé : We model cooperation between an employer and a worker union as an equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game with discounting and imperfect public monitoring. We extend the theory by allowing for strikes and other worker resistance phenomena, taking the form of low effort on the part of employees and the employer's recourse to replacement workers (or outsourcing decisions). The employer has private information about firm profitability. We construct perfect public equilibria in which strikes appear randomly on the equilibrium path, during finite-duration spells triggered by the occurrence of a low-profitability state. Equilibria exhibit money-burning (i.e. conflict) and wage-compression as in the recent literature on relational contracts; they are first-best inefficient if the player's discount rate is smaller than one; but expected equilibrium surplus can be higher than in the second-best incentive-efficient mechanism of the constituent game. The model predicts a counter-cyclical incidence of strikes. Higher bonuses or wages are associated with longer strikes because of incentive constraints, but strikes do not cause raises.