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Jeudi 31 Mai 2012

David L. FULLER (Concordia University, Department of Economics, Canada) présentera une communication :

"Unemployment Insurance Take-up Rates in an Equilibrium Search Model"

de 14 h à 15 h 30 en Salle S016 à l'INSEE-CREST, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri, 92245 MALAKOFF (Métro : Malakoff/Plateau de Vanves (Immeuble "Malakoff 2)).

Abstract : In this paper we analyze the issue of unemployment insurance (UI) take-up rates. We develop a theory of take-up rates based on endogenous costs to applying for benefits, and quantitatively explore the implications of our theory. Specifically, we use a search model with matching frictions where firms finance UI with a per-worker tax, but can partially control these costs by varying advertising intensity to attract workers who would not collect benefits upon future separation. The endogenous costs to applying arise as workers who collect benefits face a slower job arrival rate than non-collectors.

We estimate take-up rates for the U.S. economy from 1989-2011, using state-specific eligibility rules, and calibrate the model using a detailed version of the U.S. unemployment insurance system. Quantitatively, we find that the take-up rate increases when the replacement rate increases, but decreases with increases in the maximum benefit amount and potential benefit duration. We also find that when compared to the standard model that abstracts from take-up decisions, our model has different predictions for how equilibrium outcomes respond to changes in the UI system.