Tous les séminaires
Jeudi 31 Mai 2012
David L. FULLER (Concordia University, Department of Economics, Canada) présentera une communication :
de 14 h à 15 h 30 en Salle S016 à l'INSEE-CREST, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri, 92245 MALAKOFF (Métro : Malakoff/Plateau de Vanves (Immeuble "Malakoff 2)).
Abstract : In this paper we analyze the issue of unemployment insurance (UI) take-up rates. We develop a theory of take-up rates based on endogenous costs to applying for benefits, and quantitatively explore the implications of our theory. Specifically, we use a search model with matching frictions where firms finance UI with a per-worker tax, but can partially control these costs by varying advertising intensity to attract workers who would not collect benefits upon future separation. The endogenous costs to applying arise as workers who collect benefits face a slower job arrival rate than non-collectors.